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A COMMENTARY ON REGIONAL
INSTITUTIONS IN THE PACIFIC RIM:
DO APEC AND ASEAN STILL MATTER?
THOMAS C. FISCHER*
Not long ago, the Asia-Pacific rim was the darling of investors
and entrepreneurs.  President Clinton called it America’s new
economic frontier.1  But that was before the so-called Asian
“meltdown,” when numerous regional economies imploded.  In its
wake, attention turned to Europe and Latin America, and to
international undertakings like the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO).  This
essay addresses the principal Pacific Rim trade associations, the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and the Association of
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and asks what role they might
play in regional recovery and the process of globalization.  It argues
that APEC and ASEAN are still relevant and often act synergistically
with other international undertakings.  In particular, ASEAN can, at
the very least, help to give a collective voice to smaller Asian nations,
while APEC initiatives can have a profound impact on WTO
negotiations.
This essay is divided into three sections.  The first section
provides a brief description of the region and a history of the
evolution of APEC and ASEAN.  The second section discusses the
failure (in Seattle in 1999) to launch a new GATT negotiating round,
and the subsequent success in doing so (in Doha in 2001).  The final
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1. President William J. Clinton, Remarks to the Parliament in Canberra (Nov. 20, 1996).
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section outlines current changes in the Pacific Rim, and argues that
regional and multinational groups will most likely continue to work
synergistically on trade-related matters rather than competing with
one another.
I. THE PACIFIC RIM IN A NUTSHELL
A. Economic Overview of the Region
The Pacific Rim encompasses a diverse group of states.
Economically speaking, Australia is as different from China and
Japan,2 as the United States is from Chile.3  But within this group, the
subset of Southeast Asian states share important commonalties.  For
example, when the region is considered as a whole, most of its
economies are low-income economies with a per capita gross national
product (GNP) of approximately $1,000 or less.4  The region enjoyed
spectacular economic success in the mid-1990s.5  Subsequently, the
region suffered the effects of the Asian “meltdown,” as the region’s
most growth-oriented economies abruptly stalled.6  Today, the
                                                          
2. Australia has a population of about nineteen million, a population density of three
persons per km2, and a per capita gross national income (GNI) in purchasing power parity of
$25,780.  China’s population is some 1.2 billion people, which is one-fifth of the world’s total.  It
has a population density of 136 and a per capita GNI in purchasing power parity of $4,260.
Japan has a population of over 127 million people, a population density of 349, and a per capita
GNI in purchasing power parity of $27,430.  See THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT
REPORT 2003 234 (2003).
3. The United States has a population estimated at 284 million people and a per capita
GNI in purchasing power parity of $34,870.  Chile, with 15.4 million people, has a per capita
GNI in purchasing power parity of a little over a quarter of the per capita GDP of the United
States at $9,420.  Id. at 234–35.
4. Based on figures for Brunei, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Papua
New Guinea, The Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand and Vietnam, available at
http://www.apecsec.org.sq/member/indi.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2002) (citing ECONOMIST:
POCKETWORLD IN FIGURES: 2003 EDITION and THE APEC REGIONAL TRADE AND
INVESTMENT 2002).  See also THE WORLD BANK, ANNUAL REPORT 2002 (2002), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/annualreport/2002/chap0503.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2003).  The
World Bank Annual Report lists twenty-two “East Asian and Pacific” nations, including China,
with a population of 1.8 billion persons and a per capita GNI of $900.
5. THE WORLD BANK, ANNUAL REPORT 82 (1996), available at http://www.worldbank.
org/ html/extpb/annrep96/annrep96.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2002) (stating that “[in] 1995, the
region outperformed other developing regions . . . and posted the most rapid growth rate in the
world: 9.2[%]”) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT].
6. For a full treatment of the “Asian Crisis,” see generally THOMAS C. FISCHER, THE
UNITED STATES, THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND THE “GLOBALIZATION” OF WORLD TRADE, ch.
13 (2000) (describing the shaky foundations of export-oriented economies in which market
influences were not allowed to function normally).
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situation seems to be turning around.  In 2000, Asia’s gross domestic
product (GDP) grew at a rate of 3.5%.  Developing Asia recorded
GDP growth of 7%, while the five Asian countries most affected by
the financial turbulence of 1997–98 grew 6.5%.7  The area also has
tremendous growth potential.8  Although the impact of September
11th and the slowdown in the U.S. economy again hampered Asian
economic recovery in 2001,9 forecasters are expecting regional growth
to accelerate.10  Even so, the Asian region still has monumental
political and structural problems.  These are exacerbated by the
region’s great diversity of economies, trading structures, culture and
history.  The distance to be crossed to attain stable, private, open
economies is enormous and the problems (including the recent
financial crisis and jealousies among Asian states) are many.11
The structural problems of Asia are far greater than commonly
                                                          
7. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS 2001 13 (2001),
available at http://www.wto.org (last visited Sept. 18, 2002).
8. See generally Daniel Pruzin, FDI in Asian Developing Countries Has Proved Resilient,
UNCTAD Reports, 16 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 744 (1999) (reporting that foreign direct
investment into Asian developing countries declined by 7% in 1998 but was still higher than
investment inflows registered before the regions fiscal crisis); Stephen Fidler, IMF forecasts
sharp rise in net private capital inflow: Emerging economies’ improved growth prospects attract
funds for investment, FIN. TIMES (London ed.), Sept. 23, 1999, at 4 (reporting that the IMF’s
World Economic Outlook predicted that net inflows of private capital to emerging economies
were expected to almost double in 2000).
9. According to the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council’s (PECC) Pacific Economic
Outlook, the weighted average output of Asia Pacific economies grew just 1.2% in that year.
Except for the “meltdown” year (1998), this was the lowest regional growth rate in fifty years.
See PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION COUNCIL, PECC OVERVIEW 2002–03: A REGION
GETTING OFF ITS KNEES, available at http://www.pacificeconomicoutlook.com/overview.htm
(last visited Feb. 10, 2003) [hereinafter PECC OVERVIEW].
10. Regional growth is expected to accelerate to 2.7% in 2002 and 3.8% in 2003.  China, the
region’s new economic engine, is expected to grow over 7.5% in 2002 and beyond.  See PECC
OVERVIEW, supra note 9.  Rapid recovery is also expected in Singapore and Taiwan and on
balance, many Asian economies seem well on the mend, subject only to the return of foreign
investment and unforeseen external shocks.  Nevertheless, Asian economies are still at risk of
stumbling all over again.  Asia’s roller coaster rides, ECONOMIST, Oct. 21, 2000, at 81 (predicting
that the slowdown in OECD countries combined with a rise in oil prices will lead to continued
turmoil in Asian markets); Stable but sickly, ECONOMIST, Sept. 1, 2001, at 63 (reporting a
general stabilization in Southeast Asian politics but continued concern over economic turmoil);
Another bout of flu, ECONOMIST, Nov. 24, 2001, at 65 (emphasizing that the Asian downturn is a
more serious manifestation of a general worldwide recession); John Edwards, Why south-east
Asia will recover, FIN. TIMES, July 25, 2001, at 13, available at 2001 WL 25831536 (changes in
Southeast Asian economies have led to stability).
11. See generally Milan Brahmbhatt, APEC-Asian Pacific Cooperation: ‘Miracle’ is
consigned to the history books, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2001, at 6, also available at 2001 WL
29303395 (stating that there is no single reason for Asia’s trade difficulties, but a dependence on
exports and the cyclical nature of the high-tech industry have been contributing factors).
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acknowledged.  Population growth is expected to place a tremendous
strain on infrastructure.12  National road, energy, and
telecommunications networks are generally underdeveloped and
often overburdened.13  The World Bank estimates that, in order to
meet the demands of rapid modernization, increased urbanization,
and trade integration, “East Asian countries will need to invest
between $1.2 trillion and $1.5 trillion, or 7% of regional GDP, in
transportation, power, telecommunications, and water and sanitary
facilities in the next decade.”14  Meeting this challenge (if it can be
met) will require substantial foreign capital and technical know-how.15
Although Asian nations are beginning to consult with one
another more and to liberalize their economies, they remain further
from developing a comprehensive trade policy than either the nations
of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) or the
European Union (EU).  Part of this is due to their many
dissimilarities.  Indeed, labels aside, it is difficult to claim the
existence of a “Pacific Community.”16  Furthermore, these nations are
very sensitive about being “bracketed” or “bullied” by the West.  The
significant trading difficulties the United States has experienced with
                                                          
12. See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 84 (forecasting that the population in East
Asian towns would triple, from 500 million in the early 1990s, to 1.5 billion by 2020, while
infrastructure requirements would surge from $70 billion in 1992 to $200 billion in 2000).
13. In India, for example, 60% of freight traffic occurs on clogged roads; only 358 km of the
national road network of 34,000 km are four-lanes wide.  India has a persistent energy shortage
of about 9%, with an average peak-demand shortfall of 20%.  Although telecommunications is
improving faster than any other infrastructure sector, there still is just one telephone for every
hundred persons.  See John Zubrzycki, Infrastructure deficit will set ceiling on India’s growth,
THE AUSTRALIAN, Nov. 25, 1996, at 16.
14. See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 88.
15. WORLD BANK, INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT IN EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC:
TOWARDS A NEW PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP (1996).  But cf. Justin Fox, The Great
Emerging Markets Rip-Off, FORTUNE, May 11, 1998, at 98 (analyzing the cause for the Asian
crisis and the failure of emerging market investing to garner a significant return).  Until the
meltdown began in 1997, Southeast Asia did not have difficulty attracting capital.  Indeed,
excluding Japan, Asia was expected to eclipse Western Europe by the turn of the century as the
most popular destination for foreign direct investment (FDI).  Guy de Jonquières, World Trade
News: Asia set to become top investment target, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1996, at 5 (predicting that
Asia would overtake western Europe as the most popular destination for foreign direct
investment within five years); see also ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 82–83; UNCTAD
Cites Drop in Foreign Direct Investment by Asian Firms, 16 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1358
(1999) (reporting that FDI in developing Asian-Pacific countries fell by a quarter in 1998 and
predicting a continued decrease in 1999).
16. Robert Manning & Paula Stern, The Myth of the Pacific Community, 73 FOREIGN AFF.
No. 6, at 80 (suggesting that a host of political, military and psychological trends indicate the
ideal of a U.S.-led Pacific Community could be unattainable).
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the most westernized of the Asian economies—namely Japan—
should indicate just how far removed their trading philosophies and
structures are from those of Western nations.17  Nevertheless, given
the key role that export expansion plays in Asian economic recovery
and development, it is imperative that Asian economies cooperate
more closely on trade policy.  In so doing, a “blended” approach—a
hybrid of Eastern (characterized by flexibility) and Western
approaches (characterized by enforceable obligations)—is most likely
to be successful in the near term.
How might such a blended approach come about?  There are at
least three important considerations when evaluating the future of
economic development and trade policy cooperation in the region.
First, note that the principal capitalist trading groups—NAFTA and
the EU—have not yet developed a collaborative approach to market
opening in Asia.  That leaves some of the major players, such as
Japan, China, and other key members of the two major Asian
regional associations—APEC and ASEAN  (both discussed in detail
below)—free to pit North American and European interests against
one another when negotiating the terms of market openings, and the
solicitation of capital and technical support.  If NAFTA nations and
the EU Member States were not so competitive in their attempts to
open Asian trade and pursued a more coordinated approach,18 then
Asian nations would have less room to maneuver.  Moreover, the
existing associations of trading nations in Asia—chiefly APEC and
ASEAN—are more loosely-organized than either the EU or
NAFTA.  They lack signed treaties, legitimate supranational
institutions, and any mechanism to resolve disputes or enforce
obligations (which are voluntary anyway).  This is the way the Asian
members want it.
In terms of a “blended approach,” Asian members of both
                                                          
17. See generally ASEAN looks to the new year, ECONOMIST, Dec. 19, 1998, at 47; Toshio
Aritake & Corbett B. Daly, USTR Official Urges Japan to Lower NTT’s Rates, Hinting at WTO
Action, 17 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 468 (2000) (the United States threatens action unless
Japan deregulates its telecom industry); James Fallows, How the Far East was won, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP., Dec. 8, 1997, at 11 (arguing that the structural design of Asian economies led
to the turmoil in Asian markets).
18. Peter Montagnon & Ted Bardacke, Europe will be ‘sympathetic’ on freer trade, FIN.
TIMES, Mar. 4, 1996, at 4 (reporting that Europe will give ‘serious and sympathetic response’ to
APEC suggestions that it match APEC trade liberalization with market opening measures of its
own); Ted Bardacke & Peter Montagnon, Europe and Asia in accord to increase volume of
exchanges, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1996, at 4 (describing the start of a series of exchanges and
meetings between European and Asian leaders signaling increased trade links).
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associations want to keep the agreements flexible; they do not want to
let Western nations or legalisms control (that is, they will not commit
to fixed deadlines or enforceable obligations).  Whatever
“agreements” may be reached are “in principle” only.  This is a far
more Eastern than Western approach to trade policy.  Due to the size
and potential of the market involved, American and European
nations have little choice but to agree.  Conversely, the Asian nations
realize that they need western capital and expertise, particularly after
the recent regional “meltdown” and during the current recession.
Economic recovery is still precarious, and in need of short-term
(perhaps APEC and ASEAN) and long-term (perhaps the WTO)
stimulus.  Trade liberalization measures adopted by APEC and
ASEAN have had an impact on the WTO and the GATT (to which
most APEC members are signatories), and vice versa.  The WTO,
APEC, and ASEAN can act synergistically, sometimes “leap
frogging” one another in order to set the pace for trade liberalization.
Both East and West are gradually learning to coexist and cooperate
on trade matters.
B. The History of Asian Regional Associations
1. APEC.  The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (or
group)—APEC—is a real witches’ brew of the region’s trading
“economies.”  APEC’s twenty-one members19 represent both very
large and very small economies, those that are highly developed and
those that are just beginning to develop, and they run the gamut from
capitalism to communism.  Once unkindly described as “four
adjectives in search of a noun,”20 the addition of the word “forum” or
“group” to APEC’s title suggests just how loose this regional trading
block is.  Indeed, its lack of any signed treaty, any central institutions
(save for a Secretariat in Singapore), any concrete commitments or a
mechanism to enforce its agreements, makes one wonder whether
APEC should be called a regional trade entity at all.21  Its membership
                                                          
19. As of December, 2001, the “economies” that are members of APEC are: Australia,
Brunei, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand,
Papua New Guinea, Peru, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand,
the United States, and Vietnam. See Member Economies, at http://www.apecsec.org.sg/
loadall.htm?http://www.apecsec.org.sg/member/apecmemb.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2002).
20. The oft-quoted quip was made by Australia’s former Foreign Minister Gareth Evans.
Alan Freeman, Leaders Aim for Free Trade at APEC Forum, GLOBE & MAIL, Nov. 12, 1994, at
B4.
21. An excellent article exploring APEC’s status as an international institution is: Melissa
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is composed of “economies” rather than “nations” in order to finesse
the problem of the three Chinas (the People’s Republic of China
(PRC), Hong Kong, and Taiwan). 22
Yet, APEC clearly has influence, so it would be wrong to treat it
as less than a de facto organization.  Moreover, it has achieved some
surprising results in its short history.  Originally assembled at
Canberra in 1989, APEC’s early meetings were attended only by
ministerial representatives.  In 1993, President Clinton succeeded in
bringing together in Seattle the heads of each member economy,
except Malaysia.  From that point forward, APEC’s economic leaders
have set an agenda that is far more ambitious than any previous
agenda set forth by their ministers.23  At Bogor (Indonesia) in 1994,
for example, the leaders agreed to what is called the “Bogor
Declaration,” committing APEC members to the “goals of free and
open trade in the region” by 2010 for industrialized members and by
2020 for developing economies.24  This was a bold step, for it included
not just tariffs, but non-tariff barriers (NTBs), such as the arcane
customs documents and testing requirements that abound in highly
protected markets.  On the other hand, the pledge included a long
time-line, when none of the signatories to it were likely to be in
power.  Last, it was just a gentlemen’s agreement.  It had no legally
binding effect.  The concept now is called “open regionalism.”25
The following year, the Bogor Declaration gained substantial
infrastructure, allowing various economic sectors to be assessed
independently and compared, so that progress in tariff and non-tariff
                                                                                                                                     
Castan, APEC: International Institution? A Pacific Solution, 15 U. TASMANIA L. REV. 52 (1996)
(providing a good overview of APEC’s structural evolution and noting that, unlike most
international institutions, APEC lacks legal personality).
22. China has not waved from its demand that Taiwan and Hong Kong be considered part
of one China.  Mure Dickie, Beijing softens “One China” definition, FIN. TIMES (London ed.),
Aug. 28, 2000, at 8; Taiwan’s China Dare, ECONOMIST, Mar. 25, 2000, at 17, available at 2000
WL 8141282 (chronicling tension between the People’s Republic and Taiwan).
23. Gary G. Yerkey, What is APEC?, 16 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1454 (1999) (President
Clinton argues that top-level meetings were needed to advance APEC’s work).
24. APEC ADVISORY GROUPS, EMINENT PERSONS GROUP (EPG), ASIA PACIFIC
ECONOMIC COOPERATION FORUM, IMPLEMENTING THE APEC VISION, THIRD REPORT OF
THE EMINENT PERSONS GROUP (1995), available at http://www.apecsec.org.sg/virtualib/
history/epg/epg95.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2002).  The APEC Secretariat is also an excellent
source of digested information about the past and future of APEC.  APEC Secretariat, available
at http://www.apecsec.org.sg/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2003).
25. See generally International Agreements: APEC Ministers Urge Transparency, Dynamism
in Individual Action Plans, 13 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 29 d26 (1996).
FISCHER.DOC 09/03/03  5:01 PM
344 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 13:337
liberalization could be tracked toward the Bogor goals.26  The result
was the so-called Osaka Action Agenda (OAA).27  The OAA
provided that the entire APEC trade liberalization and facilitation
process should be governed by overarching principles.  First, the
process was to be comprehensive and consistent with its Members’
commitments under the Uruguay Round of GATT.  Second, the
plans for each economy’s effort to liberalize were to be comparable,
non-discriminatory, and transparent (laws, regulations and
administrative procedures affecting the flow of goods, services and
capital among APEC economies must be notified or easily
ascertainable).  Third, APEC members were to “endeavor to refrain”
from taking measures that would increase the level of protection then
in force (essentially a “standstill” provision).  Finally, the Action
Agenda was to be a continuous process, characterized by flexibility
and cooperation, which is APEC’s unwavering bottom line.28
The OAA covered barriers to trade in fifteen areas.29  As the list
reveals, it was both ambitious and comprehensive.  Moreover, it
closely approximated the agendas of the EU and the WTO.  The
Action Agenda called upon “APEC economies [to] ensure full and
effective implementation of Uruguay Round [of GATT] outcomes
within the agreed time frame;” to gather and analyze trade
information in order to isolate impediments and remove them; and to
plot progress toward full liberalization.30  The processes of data
                                                          
26. AUSTRALIA-JAPAN RESEARCH CENTER, IMPLEMENTING THE APEC BOGOR
DECLARATION, RESEARCH SCHOOL OF PACIFIC AND ASIAN STUDIES, THE AUSTRALIAN
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY (1995) (providing a very good, short study of APEC history, the Bogor
goals, and the road to Osaka).  The Australia-Japan Research Center at Canberra is another
excellent source of research material about APEC.  The Research School’s homepage is
available at http://rspas.anu.edu.au/contact.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2003).
27. ASIA PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION, THE OSAKA ACTION AGENDA:
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BOGOR DECLARATION (1995), available at http://apecsec.org.sg/
ecotech/osakaaap2e.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2002) [hereinafter THE OSAKA ACTION
AGENDA].
28. Id. at 2–3.
29. Id.  The areas in which barriers to trade are addressed in the OAA are Tariffs, Non-
tariff measures, Services (telecommunications, transportation, energy, tourism), Investment,
Standards and Conformance, Customs Procedures, Intellectual Property Rights, Competition
Policy (combined with Deregulation), Government Procurement, Deregulation, Rules of
Origin, Dispute Mediation, Mobility of Business People, Implementation of Uruguay Round
Outcomes, and Information Gathering Analysis.
30. THE OSAKA ACTION AGENDA, supra note 27; see also COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND
INVESTMENT, ASIA PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION FORUM, 1996 ANNUAL REPORT TO
MINISTERS (1996) (detailing the activities of various sectorial subgroups that meet between
annual APEC summits and reporting on progress and goals in most sectors), available at
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gathering, analysis, and ministers’ meetings were to continue
throughout the year, with an APEC leaders’ summit each autumn.
The major result of the Osaka Summit was the agreement among
APEC leaders that each of the economies would produce an
Individual Action Plan (IAP), detailing how it intended to eliminate
its tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade and investment by the target
dates.  In some unstated way these IAPs would be collected into a
Collective Action Plan (CAP).31  Throughout the spring and summer
of 1996, various APEC members worked on their plans, occasionally
shared them, and urged various improvements in the less-ambitious
ones.  When the final versions were unveiled, however, they were
described as  “meager” and “disappointing.”32
There might be many reasons for this perceived failure.  For one,
each IAP was developed in relative isolation.  APEC is premised on
voluntary and unilateral trade openings in order to minimize external
pressure.  In this type of high-stakes trade poker, however, it is
difficult to find any economy willing to take the first step.  If others do
not follow, as explained by the “prisoners’ dilemma” game of rational
choice theory, the economy that takes the first step will be more
exposed to competition, without having gained any reciprocal
concession.  If no one takes the first step, however, no progress is
made.
A second reason why the IAPs may be considered disappointing
is that many APEC members interpreted the Osaka commitment to
require only that they reiterate the market opening steps already
agreed upon and to propose some further liberalization (mostly tariff
reductions).  Thus, in their view, the IAPs were not comprehensive
“blueprints” (i.e., they did not purport to detail how each economy
would arrive at complete trade liberalization by the Bogor deadlines).
                                                                                                                                     
http://www.apecsec.org.sg/cti/cti96/01anurpt.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2002).
31. See ANNUAL REPORT TO MINISTERS, supra note 30; ASIA PACIFIC ECONOMIC
COOPERATION, CONVENOR’S REPORT ON COLLECTIVE ACTIONS, OSAKA ACTION AGENDA
ISSUE AREA 1: TARIFFS STATUS.
32. See generally 18 APEC Members Submit Action Plans at Cebu Meeting to Liberalize
Trade, 13 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 22 d15 (1996); Gary G. Yerkey & Mark Felsenthal, APEC
Ministers Urge Transparency, Dynamism in Individual Action Plans, 13 INT’L TRADE REP.
(BNA) 1173, 1173–74 (1996) (reporting on calls by APEC trade ministers for increased
cooperation and action in voluntary trade liberalization assurances); Gary G. Yerkey, ‘Meager’
APEC Action Plans Put Forward; Major Trade Initiatives at Manila Summit Unlikely, 13 INT’L
TRADE REP. (BNA) 1196 (1996) (reporting that National Security Council Director for Asian
Affairs warned of a “tough year” for APEC and predicted that major trade initiatives would be
unlikely at a coming APEC summit).
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As a result, some of the more liberalized economies—particularly the
United States and Japan—were criticized for not making bolder
proposals.  Their failure to do so set a conservative example for more
timid members, whose nationals probably would not support greater
market opening without equal gestures from developed nations.  That
is, it was difficult to get anyone to take the first step.33  Finally, the
IAPs lacked a single format or compatible data.  The result is that it
became difficult—if not impossible—for the APEC Secretariat (or
any other research entity) to produce a collective plan.
Notwithstanding disappointment with the IAPs, APEC leaders at
the Manila Summit on November 25, 1996 accepted that the
“individual and collective initiatives . . . to implement the Osaka
Action Agenda . . . [were just] the first steps of an evolutionary
process . . . .”34  The trade ministers themselves have called the IAPs
“living documents, due to rollover many times.”  Thus, while the
Manila meeting did not produce any CAP of the sort contemplated at
Osaka, the eighteen IAPs did give the APEC Secretariat some data
that it might massage into the beginnings of a “collective” plan.
Further, seventeen of eighteen APEC economies pledged to lower
tariffs from existing levels.35  These agreements added to the database
of economic information maintained by the APEC Secretariat, which,
at the very least, gives a better view of progress and retrenchment of
the various APEC economies.36  Thus, while some perceived the IAP
                                                          
33. ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION, APEC ECONOMIC LEADERS’
DECLARATIONS: FROM VISION TO ACTION, pts. 5–6 (1996), available at http://www.apecsec.
org.sg/ virtualib/econlead/subic.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2003) [hereinafter DECLARATIONS].
34. Id.
35. See Peter Hartcher, APEC speeds towards free trade, THE AUSTRALIAN FIN. TIMES,
Nov. 25, 1996, at 1.
36. The Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) is a unique partnership of
business, government and research representatives from 22 Asia Pacific economies who work on
practical government and business policy issues to increase trade investment and economic
development in the region.  PECC is one of three observer organizations of APEC and the only
non-governmental body given that status.  PECC representatives attend APEC Ministerial
meetings, the Senior Officials meetings and other working group meetings.  For an overview of
PECC, see PECC’s website, at http://www.pecc.net (last visited Mar. 2, 2003).  In anticipation of
the Manila meeting, PECC attempted to show that most of the 18 APEC economies were “on
track” to achieve their 2010–20 deadlines.  Two notable exceptions, however, were the United
States and Japan.  But some economies, like Thailand, were well ahead of their Bogor
commitment, with un-weighted tariffs down from about 40% in 1990 to fewer than 20% in 1996.
Japan, meanwhile, was on schedule at the time of Bogor, but has let its average tariff increase
since.  U.S. tariffs, already low, remained unchanged.  See generally PACIFIC ECONOMIC
COOPERATION COUNCIL (PECC), SURVEY OF IMPEDIMENTS TO TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN
THE APEC REGION (P. Drysdale ed., 1995); see 8–9, 56–57; PECC, MILESTONE IN APEC
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process to have been a failure in certain ways, the fact that these
agreements exist is itself a further liberalizing step.
Even if the IAPs between Osaka and Manila disappointed many,
the economic leaders’ final declaration “reaffirm[ed] . . . the ultimate
[Bogor] objective.”  Moreover, the declaration was specific beyond
previous commitments.  The Manila Action Plan for APEC (MAPA)
was acknowledged to be the “implementation phase” of the Bogor
declaration.  In MAPA, APEC economies agreed to “align national
standards with international standards and . . . [to] recognize each
other’s national standards.”  Finally, APEC ministers were directed
“to intensify work in 1997 on simplification of customs clearance
procedures, effective implementation of intellectual property rights
commitments[,] . . . facilitation of comprehensive trade in services,
and enhancing the environment for investments.”37  These pledges,
while not guaranteed, did add important new layers to prior
agreements.
Other major pledges appear in the final MAPA declaration as
well.  The leaders recognized the “primacy” of the WTO over
regional groups (like APEC), but urged the former to take efforts to
complete trade negotiations in the financial services and
telecommunications sectors.38  The leaders also shifted away from
national “foreign aid” programs, whereby wealthy states aid poor
                                                                                                                                     
LIBERALIZATION: A MAP OF MARKET OPENING MEASURES BY APEC ECONOMIES (1995);
PECC, PERSPECTIVES ON THE MANILA ACTION PLAN FOR APEC 12–15 (2d ed. 1996).  See also
Hartcher, supra note 35, at 1; David Jenkins, Free trade on track, whatever they say, SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD, Nov. 23, 1996, at 36.
37. DECLARATIONS, supra note 33, pts. 1–10.
38. Specifically, APEC leaders called for the elimination of substantially all tariffs on
information technology within its membership by the year 2000, and urged the WTO to do
likewise (APEC agreements have spurred international negotiations, notably in
telecommunications, because, although small in membership, APEC represents a large portion
of the world economy).  The United States and other developed economies in the Pacific Rim
(Canada, Japan) have often used the APEC forum to leverage and advance their own trade
agendas.  See generally New Zealand Urges APEC to Adopt Policies to Level Field for Foreign
Competitors, 16 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 999 (1999) (describing New Zealand’s efforts to
compel APEC to combat cartels and promote competition); Gary G. Yerkey, U.S. Urges APEC
to Back Science-Based Biotech Trade, in Message Aimed at EU, 16 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA)
1428 (1999) (describing U.S. efforts to compel APEC to approve language included in a
communiqué that would affirm the importance of “timely, transparent and science-based
approaches” to the introduction and use of biotechnology products) [hereinafter Biotech Trade];
Gary G. Yerkey, Leaders of APEC Agree to Back ‘Single Package’ Approach to WTO, 16 INT’L
TRADE REP. (BNA) 1491 (1999) (discussing the agreement among APEC members to launch a
new round of global trade talks aimed at the adoption of a package of market-opening
commitments) [hereinafter ‘Single Package’].
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ones.  Rather, there was to be greater capital investment and
technology transfer among APEC economies, beyond just foreign aid.
Further, this was to be accomplished “in partnership with the private
sector,” from which the bulk of capital and technical know-how must
come.39  Building on the last theme of the MAPA, APEC leaders
affirmed “the central role of the business sector in the APEC
process,” particularly the contributions of APEC’s Business Advisory
Council (ABAC),40 a collection of business leaders appointed by the
APEC economic leaders to provide them with advice on the
implementation of the OAA and to provide a business perspective on
certain key issues.
The Manila Summit, to some extent, maintained the
“momentum” of Bogor and Osaka in that it did not retreat from
previous commitments and most APEC members pledged to increase
their commitment as well.  The MAPA added numerous non-tariff
initiatives to the tariff pledges that preceded it.  There are also
numerous examples of unilateral openings, including: Japan pledging
to open its telecommunications market; Singapore foreswearing its
monopoly of the same; an increase in U.S. auto dealerships in Japan;
China lifting its ban on leasing farmland to foreigners; and South
Korea opening its construction market to outsiders.41  Yet, at the same
                                                          
39. See DECLARATIONS, supra note 33, pt. 17.
40. See id. pts. 22–23.  ABAC was authorized by APEC leaders in Osaka and is composed
of the heads of small, medium and large enterprises drawn from the APEC economies.
International businesspersons are an important source of advice because they confront daily the
nettlesome restrictions that limit trade and, as a consequence, the economic growth upon which
political leaders rely to stay in power.  While businesses may be less concerned than some non-
governmental organizations about the social and environmental consequences of international
trade, they are very interested in developing economies.  According to ABAC’s co-chair, the
group “will give APEC leaders direct, hard-hitting, and specific advice [because] business wants
APEC to act quickly . . . .”  See APEC Business Advisory Group to focus its efforts on
investment, other issues, 13 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 26 d7 (1996).  Part of the ABAC exercise
is to get trade liberalization ideas from business leaders.  But other motives seem evident as
well.  One is to involve them in the lobbying effort to convince the general public that trade
liberalization is desirable.  After all, trade liberalization would shed many customs jobs and
expose domestic businesses to more foreign competition.  Hence, many local constituencies
oppose market opening.  The second thrust of the ABAC is to mobilize local business persons
to put pressure on national leaders to accelerate the pace of opening, to show them where and
how to do it, and to hold them accountable for a failure to be competitive.  Thus, the ABAC is a
way for the private sector to leverage public policy.  See Brent Davis, Business is looking for
some results, THE AUSTRALIAN, Nov. 22, 1996, at 35.  For more information on ABAC, see
ABAC Online, at http://www.abaconline.org (last visited Mar. 2, 2003).
41. Michiyo Nakamoto, Cable operator breaks into Japan telecoms, FIN. TIMES (London
ed.), Oct. 1, 1996, at 5; Foreign investment: Singapore sets out terms for telecom liberalization, 14
INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 174 (1997); U.S. automotive outlets in Japan increase, 13 INT’L
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time the Manila Summit may have reflected a certain cooling of
enthusiasm for market liberalization.42  Indeed, there are several
“pet” trade areas, such as agriculture and textiles, in which APEC
economies resisted liberalization.  A few examples include: China,
Japan, and South Korea’s exclusion of their uncompetitive farming
sectors from the APEC principle; South Korea’s reticence to open
large portions of its financial, business, transport and business services
sectors to foreign investment; and China’s failure to curb computer
disk piracy.43
The outcome of the 1996 Manila APEC meeting was to steer a
steady—if slower—course toward market integration, with more
sectors involved.  The leaders’ agreement to liberalize trade in
information technology fully by the year 2000 put leverage on WTO
ministers in Singapore to charge Japan, the United States, and the EU
with concluding their ITA negotiations by March 1997 as a basis for
reaching a WTO information technology agreement.
Despite a pair of disappointing summits in 1997 and 1998,44 the
                                                                                                                                     
TRADE REP. (BNA) 1390 (1996); China plans to lift ban on leasing some farmland to foreign
investors, 13 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1555 (1996); John Burton, Seoul opens building market
to foreigners, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1996, at 7.
42. For example, the Malaysian Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir, often expressed reservations
shared by his ASEAN colleagues about opening markets too rapidly.  In his opinion, it was
“unrealistic and grossly unfair to coerce particularly the less-advanced member economies to
undertake liberalisation measures at a pace and manner beyond their capacity.”  Dr. Mahathir
felt that less-developed nations should be given more time and more aid from APEC to open
their markets.  Peter Hartcher, Mahathir’s APEC plea for poorer members, AUSTRALIAN FIN.
REV., Nov. 25, 1996, at 8; Michael Gordon, Mahathir urges slower APEC pace, THE
AUSTRALIAN, Nov. 25, 1996, at 5.
43. William Dawkins, Farm row halts APEC trade talks, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1995, at 3;
Frances Williams, WTO calls for Korean reforms, FIN. TIMES (Int’l ed.), Oct. 2, 1996, at 5;
Intellectual Property: Chinese officials acknowledge rebound in pirated disc trade, 13 INT’L
TRADE REP. (BNA) 1550 (1996).
44. By the time of the November 1997 leaders’ summit in Vancouver, Canada and the
November 1998 meeting of APEC leaders in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, the Asian financial crisis
had begun to bite deeply, and the heads of state were more interested in stabilizing effected
economies than pushing liberalization.  Despite the turmoil, they agreed to press forward with
liberalization in nine industry sectors worth $1.5 trillion.  If anything, the November 1998
meeting of APEC leaders in Kuala Lumpur was even more disappointing than the one in
Vancouver.  President Clinton did not attend due to tensions between the United States and
Iraq.  But even if he had, financial conditions in Asia would still have favored retrenchment
over liberalization.  Vice President Gore gave an ill-advised speech criticizing the human rights
record of the host nation, and Japan, contrary to its prior APEC commitments, announced its
firm intention not to liberalize its forestry and fish industries.  Although APEC earlier had been
a leader in liberalizing trade in Asia and the world, its cohesion now appeared to be eroding.
APEC seemed divided and paralyzed by the political and economic pressures generated by the
Asian crisis, pressures that stimulated protective behavior everywhere.  Nevertheless, APEC
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late 1999 APEC leaders’ summit in Auckland was moderately
successful.  By that time, the financial crisis in Asia had begun to
subside.  Nonetheless, several events conspired to take some
momentum out of the Auckland meeting.  First, the ABAC reported,
just before the summit commenced, that the actions taken by the
APEC nations did not seem ambitious enough to meet APEC’s self-
imposed Bogor deadlines.45  Further, trade disputes among APEC
members had become so numerous and severe that, if left unchecked,
substantial repercussions on the prosperity and stability of the region
could result.46  The ABAC observed that selfish, unilateral behavior
was directly counter to the economic and political realities of the
region, in which economic and political power is increasingly diffused
across a growing number of economies.47
                                                                                                                                     
ministers did agree at Kuala Lumpur to begin negotiations to liberalize the nine sectors
previously agreed to at Vancouver and the United States and Japan announced a joint plan to
“restore growth” to Asia.  Perhaps APEC was being subsumed in the broader flow of global
economic integration, because it still played a role in the Pacific Rim, albeit slow-paced by
business standards.  See, e.g., Peter Montagnon & Sheila McNulty, Trade liberalization accord
thwarted, FIN. TIMES (London ed.), Nov. 16, 1998, at 3; Japanese Stance on EVSL Could Make
APEC Meeting a ‘Failure,’ U.S. Official Says, 15 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1822 (1998) (noting
Japan’s refusal to reduce tariffs on imported forest and fish products) [hereinafter Japanese
Stance on EVSL]; APEC trade ministers to work toward tariff-cutting pact in WTO in 1999, 15
INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1912 (1998); U.S., Japan Announce Plan to Revive Growth in Asia, 15
INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1913 (1998); APEC’s family feud, ECONOMIST, Nov. 21, 1998, at 41
(discussing the repercussions of Gore’s speech in Malaysia).
45. Gary G. Yerkey, APEC Seen Missing Deadline of 2020 For Free Trade in Asia-Pacific
Region, 16 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1399 (1999) [hereinafter Missing Deadline].  APEC
economies also sought more serious and substantial commitments, especially from developed
economies and they criticized APEC for referring nine sectors in its Early Voluntary Sectorial
Liberalization (EVSL) program to the WTO.  See Philip Burton, Letter to the Rt. Hon. Jenny
Shipley, Prime Minister of New Zealand, from the ABAC Chair, in APEC BUSINESS ADVISORY
COUNCIL, ASIA PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION, APEC BUSINESS ADVISORY COUNCIL
REPORT TO THE APEC LEADERS (1999), available at http://www.abaconline.org (last visited
Mar. 2, 2003) (urging APEC economies “to take concrete steps to achieve the goal of free and
open trade and investment” and offering recommendations).
46. See Gary G. Yerkey & Toshio Aritake, Japan Warns U.S. Against Restricting Steel
Imports, 16 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1433 (1999).
47. APEC, IMPLEMENTING THE APEC VISION, supra note 24, paras. 4–7.  For example,
when Japan refused to liberalize its fish and forest sectors, U.S. Trade Representative Charlene
Barshefsky accused it of “not [playing] the leadership role it should in supporting Asian
recovery . . . .”  See Japanese Stance on EVSL, supra note 44, at 1822.  Naturally, U.S. businesses
wished to accelerate market opening in the Pacific Rim, where U.S. trade rose nearly 26%,
exceeding growth in all other regions of the world, and creating an estimated 3.8 million U.S.
jobs.  See generally HERITAGE FOUNDATION, TRADE WITH ASIA MEANS JOBS FOR AMERICA,
REPORT NO. 119 (1996).  But the pace pursued by the United States and its business interests
often exceeds what other APEC economies find acceptable.  See generally Yerkey, Missing
Deadline, supra note 45; Yerkey & Aritake, supra note 46.
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Finally, there was disagreement among APEC economies about
the agenda for the new round of GATT negotiations that was due to
be launched at the ministerial meeting of the WTO held just a few
months later in Seattle.  Some APEC members felt there was little
reason to take bold steps regionally at the Auckland summit,
especially when a different agenda would likely emerge.48  Hence, the
Auckland summit did little more than try to resuscitate the
momentum achieved at the earlier meeting in Manila and promote
certain agenda items for Seattle.
To sustain momentum, APEC ministers “reaffirm[ed] the central
role of the [IAPs].”49  They also “emphasized the need . . . to consult
closely with businesses, including the . . . ABAC [process].”50  The
ministers noted with some pleasure that “little backsliding [was]
evident in the IAPs” and that some economies had “improved” their
offers while five economies, including Japan and the United States,
had submitted their IAPs for “regular peer reviews on a voluntary
basis.”51  They also “agreed to a ‘road map’ that [set] out future work
[in very general terms] . . .”52  For the first time, APEC trade ministers
sounded more ambitious than their economic leaders.
APEC leaders then “instructed” their ministers to broaden and
deepen the APEC trading community by “intensify[ing] work.”53  This
language, appearing in the final declaration, is worded vaguely.  Each
leader could easily have given the language a different interpretation,
but it was not a weak mandate.  It recognized that the IAPs were “the
first steps [in] an evolutionary process” that was expected to expand
and intensify “through a continuous process of review and
consultations.”54  This process would occur in full public view, so
backsliding would not be easy, even if progress might be slow at
times.  Finally, with tariff levels coming down almost everywhere,
more attention would undoubtedly be given to non-tariff barriers.55
                                                          
48. Gwen Robinson, Ministers back new trade round: APEC meeting global talks
breakthrough follows setback to drive further liberalization, FIN. TIMES (London ed.), June 30,
1999, at 4.
49. ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION, JOINT STATEMENT, ELEVENTH ASIA-
PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION TRADE MINISTERS MEETING, reprinted in 16 INT’L TRADE
REP. (BNA) 1497 (1999) [hereinafter ELEVENTH MINISTERIAL MEETING, JOINT STATEMENT].
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. DECLARATIONS, supra note 33; ASIA PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION, MANILA
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These could include issues such as dumping, rules of origin, and
competition rules.  They could also reach issues of great concern to
many non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as labor
standards, environmental issues, and human rights issues.56  There
presently is no APEC consensus on these latter issues however.
At the global level, APEC ministers “underline[d] the critical
importance of . . . forthcoming WTO negotiations in liberalizing trade
and investment within the region” and noted that “[t]he pace of
globalization and the scope and depth of the [Asian] economic crisis
have underscored the need for policy responses . . . .”  But apparently
these responses were left for the global community, not APEC.  That
is, prior to the WTO debacle in Seattle, APEC leaders saw their
initiatives as facilitating global undertakings, not substituting for
them.57  Following the failure of the Seattle WTO meeting discussed
below, however, APEC leaders returned to their agenda with greater
vigor.
2. ASEAN.  ASEAN58 is the smaller and weaker of the two
important regional trade groups, and there appears to be considerable
economic competition as well as interdependence among its
members.  ASEAN members rarely present a united front in regional
economic affairs however.59  Even when they do, that consensus can
break down in the face of APEC or WTO opposition.
For example, the Asian financial crisis gave ASEAN leaders a
tailor-made opportunity to negotiate a joint recovery plan, possibly
with the help of Japan and China, Asia’s two largest economies.  Yet
                                                                                                                                     
ACTION PLAN FOR APEC §§ 5–10 (1997), available at http://www. apecsec.org.sg/ (last visited
Mar. 2, 2003).
56. The best short position paper on this point that I have seen was written by Dr. Jane
Kelsey, Law Department, University of Auckland, New Zealand for GATT Watchdog.  See Jane
Kelsey, More than a question of trade, GATT Watchdog (1996).  See also Florence Chong, Free
trade push risks a political backlash, THE AUSTRALIAN, Nov. 25, 1996, at 5.
57. See ELEVENTH MINISTERIAL MEETING, JOINT STATEMENT, supra note 49, at 1497–98
(“Ministers emphasised the need for member economies to consult closely with business,
including the APEC Business Advisory Council (ABAC) in developing the work programme.
They noted ABAC’s view that business is looking to the developed economies to take a lead in
the APEC process and show clearly how the Bogor goals are going to be achieved.”).
58. There are ten nations in the ASEAN: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia,
Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.  All current members, except
Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, are members of APEC.  See Member Countries, at
http://www.aseansec.org/74.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2003).
59. See Sheila McNulty, Asean ponders its modest role, FIN. TIMES (London ed.), July 27,
1999, at 6 (noting criticisms of the group’s effectiveness).
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the ASEAN leaders could not agree on a single plan of operation.  A
number accepted help from Japan, many arranged bailouts with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and Dr. Mahathir of Malaysia
defied the IMF and introduced currency controls.  The only issue on
which some ASEAN leaders seemed to agree was their common
resentment of “hectoring western politicians and advisors who [they
believe] do not understand Asia’s real problems.”60
Even if ASEAN has had only a modest impact on trade
liberalization in the Pacific Rim—even among its own
membership61—it has somewhat successfully lobbied in forums such
as APEC and the WTO for the concerns of emerging Asian
economies facing pressure for market opening from highly
industrialized economies.  ASEAN believes that less-developed
economies should be allowed to liberalize their markets more slowly
and to continue tariff protection for sensitive products.  It also has
called for the “elimination of agricultural subsidies,” “a review of
anti-dumping laws by wealthy nations,” and less protection for
“textiles and clothing.”62  All of these measures are meant to protect
Western markets from Asian exports.  But these pleas are made, by
and large, at the global level rather than at the regional level.63
Without western members, ASEAN nations may strengthen
their own hand in regional development.  Although ASEAN is a
loose arrangement with modest goals, it has some potential to be a
counterweight to APEC64 and the WTO.  At the very least, ASEAN
                                                          
60. ASEAN looks to the new year, supra note 17, at 47.  For general coverage of these
events, see generally THOMAS C. FISCHER, supra note 6, ch. 13.
61. See, e.g., ASEAN looks to the new year, supra note 17, at 47; Ted Bardacke, SE Asia
united as Cambodia joins Asean, FIN. TIMES, May 1, 1999, at 6.
62. Jason Gutierrez, ASEAN Members to Push for End to Farm Subsidies, Dumping
Review, 16 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1745 (1999).
63. For example, Japan’s abrupt turnaround on its agricultural and fisheries commitments.
See generally Japanese stance on ESVL, supra note 44.  See also Glen Perkinson, Thailand
Charges Some ASEAN Members Not Implementing Their AFTA Commitments, 17 INT’L
TRADE REP. (BNA) 513 (2000); Gutierrez, supra note 62; Southeast Asian Nations Accelerate
Plan for Free Trade; China vows market reforms, 16 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1951 (1999).
64. “Potential” is the operative word here, since, as detailed below, ASEAN is long on
plans, but short on implementation and its members often break rank over prior agreements.
See generally Rafael D. Frankel, ASEAN Looks to Speed Up Integration At Economic Ministers
Conference in Hanoi, 18 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1436 (2001) (discussing a spate of ASEAN
initiatives for closer cooperation).  Ambassador Aneurin Hughes, a frequent attendee of
ASEAN meetings and head of the EU’s delegation to Australia and New Zealand, reports that
“little emerged from Hanoi” and “there were unguarded comments [that ASEAN had] . . .
‘outlived its usefulness’.”  Aneurin Hughes, Letter to Thomas C. Fischer (Jan. 30, 2002) (on file
with author).
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can give a collective voice to the smaller economies in the region,
whose concerns after the WTO debacle in Seattle have moved closer
to center stage.65
II.  THE DEBACLE IN SEATTLE
Although some APEC and ASEAN leaders had hoped for a
successful WTO summit in Seattle in late 1999, success never
materialized.  After vainly struggling for four days to reach a
consensus on an agenda for a new round of GATT trade negotiations,
the summit was acrimoniously suspended.66  Much of the credit for
bringing the summit to its ignominious end was assigned to
environmental, labor, and human rights protestors, but was probably
exaggerated.67  The protestors’ complaints were on the WTO’s agenda
in some form.68  Furthermore, there were deep divisions about the
agenda and the timing of the round long before the ministerial
meeting commenced.69  President Clinton particularly polarized the
least developed countries (LDCs) in Asia and elsewhere by
suggesting that labor and environmental standards should be
enforced against them, despite the fact that cheap labor and lax
environmental rules are their chief competitive assets.70  The looming
presidential election may also have left U.S. negotiators with less
                                                          
65. See generally ASEAN looks to the new year, supra note 17, at 47.  See also Daniel
Pruzin, WTO Delays Talks on Post-Seattle Agenda; Agrees to Hold Off on Missed LDC
Deadlines, 16 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 2061 (1999) (discussing WTO agreement postponing a
discussion for a follow-up to failed Seattle ministerial conference as well as addressing LDC
demands for longer periods of time for agreement implementation); Philippines to Urge WTO
Deferral of Links to Labor, Environment Issues, 16 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1139 (1999)
(reporting the Philippines’ request that the WTO defer inclusion of labor and environmental
policy in its agenda) [hereinafter Philippines to Urge WTO Deferral].
66. Daniel Pruzin et al., WTO Seattle Ministerial Fails; Talks to Resume at a Later Date, 16
INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1990 (1999).  For comprehensive coverage of the events in Seattle,
see BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, WTO WATCH, Nos. 1–6 (1999).
67. See Michael Elliott, The New Radicals, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 13, 1999, at 36; Fareed
Zakaria, After the storm passes, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 13, 1999, at 40.
68. Philippines to Urge WTO Deferral, supra note 65, at 27; Daniel Pruzin, WTO Delays
Talks on Post-Seattle Agenda; Agrees to Hold Off on Missed LDC Deadlines, 16 INT’L TRADE
REP. (BNA) 2061 (1999).
69. See Gary G. Yerkey, U.S., EU Business Leaders See Little Backbone Behind WTO
Pledges, 16 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1804 (1999) [hereinafter Backbone]; Daniel Pruzin, WTO
Chief Describes Talks on Agenda as ‘Disappointing’ and Behind Schedule, 16 INT’L TRADE REP.
(BNA) 1869 (1999).
70. See Mark Felsenthal, Clinton Defends Labor Stance at WTO; Says Link Will Eventually
Be Accepted, 16 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 2028 (1999).
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room to maneuver.71
In the end, regional organizations like the EU, APEC, ASEAN
and NAFTA developed their Seattle agenda strategies somewhat in
isolation of one another, so they could not easily be reconciled when
they attempted to agree on important common issues.72  For example,
the United States initially wanted a sector-by-sector negotiation
where it would benefit from more leverage and an “early harvest” of
agreements in some sectors before the whole round of negotiations
was completed.  Meanwhile, most negotiators, including the EU and
APEC, generally favored a comprehensive round.  The United States
eventually capitulated, but only after it was understood that “a ‘single
package’ of market-opening commitments [would] not preclude the
possibility of early results . . . .”73  In addition, the United States and
APEC nations with large agricultural economies pushed APEC to
back the elimination of export subsidies for all agricultural products; a
position they knew the EU would find unacceptable.74
The United States also attempted to use APEC to advance its
agenda to expand trade in scientifically-secure biotechnology
products, and to secure greater transparency in public procurement.
Regional groups opposed these initiatives, as did other nations that
would not have benefited significantly.75  The United States definitely
wanted a review of dumping standards kept off the WTO agenda,
while Japan and South Korea, which the United States accused of
dumping, decidedly wanted it included.76  Only developed APEC
                                                          
71. See generally U.S. Presidential Campaign Blamed for Failure to Launch New WTO
Round, 16 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 197 (1999).  See also Mark Suzman, U.S. domestic
concerns sank Seattle, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1999, at 8 (discussing political impact of Seattle WTO
meeting).
72. See, e.g., Yerkey, Backbone, supra note 69 (describing differences in perspectives
between various regional organizations).
73. Yerkey, ‘Single Package,’ supra note 38.
74. Gary G. Yerkey, Trade Ministers to Urge WTO to Scrap Export Subsidies for
Agricultural Products, 16 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1492 (1999); Daniel Pruzin, EU
Agricultural Ministers to Defend CAP While Attacking Farm Aid by Other Nations, 16 INT’L
TRADE REP. (BNA) 1531 (1999).
75. Yerkey, Biotech Trade, supra note 38; U.S. Accuses EU and Japan of Blocking WTO
Government Procurement Agreement, 16 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 2028 (1999) [hereinafter
Procurement Agreement]; Toby McIntosh, Language on WTO Transparency Disappoints; Draft
Outcome Evidences Deep Divide, 16 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 2001 (1999).
76. Procurement Agreement, supra note 75; McIntosh, supra note 75; WTO agrees to
establish dispute panels on U.S. antidumping duties on steel, BNA INT’L TRADE DAILY, Mar. 21,
2000, available at WL 3/21/2000 BTD d10; Legal experts urge WTO to reform anti-dumping
agreement to curb abusive use, BNA INT’L TRADE DAILY, Dec. 6, 2000, available at WL
12/6/2000 BTD d8.
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economies signed on to some U.S. proposals, while others remained
neutral or openly opposed.77  It should surprise no one then, that in
this delicately balanced and contentious atmosphere, consensus even
among regional groups like APEC quickly collapsed.78
There was a growing schism between developed and developing
nations prior to the Seattle meeting.  Developing nations were having
difficulty meeting their current WTO obligations and were vulnerable
to enforcement procedures.79  Naturally, they were not as keen as
developed countries to increase their obligations through a new trade
round.  Developing nations also resented being marginalized during
the intensive agenda negotiations that preceded Seattle.80  They were
promised a larger voice in the future and a better allocation of trade
benefits, but the details remained unclear.81
Controversy among developed nations over the role of non-
governmental organizations in the WTO and the issue of
“transparency” also contributed to the failure of Seattle.  Some
developed nations wanted to give NGOs a role in WTO trade
negotiations, but many others did not.82  Similarly, many argued for
increased transparency in the work of the WTO, providing greater
public access, but many developed WTO members did not want their
bargaining to be exposed to wider public view.83  Such deep policy
divisions could not be resolved overnight and a new WTO trade
round was delayed until some type of consensus agenda could be
worked out.84
Perhaps the real problem with Seattle was that regional groups
                                                          
77. McIntosh, supra note 75.
78. U.S. proposals for transparency, APEC trade package in trouble at WTO, BNA INT’L
TRADE DAILY, Nov. 9, 1999, available at WL 11/9/1999 BTD d2; Corbett B. Daly, U.S. Official
Questions Japan’s Commitment to Next Round of WTO Trade Negotiation, 16 INT’L TRADE
REP. (BNA) 1686 (1999).
79. See, e.g., Daniel Pruzin, Five WTO Members Request Postponement of TRIMS
Deadline, 17 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 77 (2000); Daniel Pruzin, WTO Clinches Deal on
Addressing Implementation by Developing Nations, 17 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 741 (2000).
80. Gary G. Yerkey, Poorer Nations Want to Be Directly Involved in WTO Talks Before
Agreeing to New Round, 17 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 742 (2000).
81. See id.; Daniel Pruzin, WTO Members Bicker Over Seattle Initiative to Aid Poorest
Countries, Win Their Support, 16 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1875 (1999); WTO’s Next Director-
General Backs New Round for Developing Nations, 17 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1848 (2000).
82. Lawrence Speer, OECD Discusses Trade Liberalization with NGOs, But Wide
Differences Persist, 17 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1667 (2000).
83. Toby McIntosh, supra note 75.
84. Id.; Frances Williams, WTO faces challenging times down on the farm, FIN. TIMES
(London ed.), Apr. 11, 2001, at 15.
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deferred too many issues to the WTO ministerial meeting whenever
they could not agree.  In any event, the WTO ministerial meeting
failed and was recessed save for previously agreed negotiations in the
areas of agriculture and services sectors.85  The momentum also
shifted from comprehensive negotiations trade towards smaller,
more-cohesive regional groups of traders to advance liberalization
proposals that were more acceptable to them.86  Thus, with the failure
of the Seattle ministerial meeting, regional institutions like APEC
and ASEAN had the opportunity to play larger roles in defining and
building consensus behind the trade agenda and consensus might be
more quickly and easily achieved at the regional level.87  Indeed, a
group as diverse, and with a market share as large as that of APEC,
should be able to substantially influence other WTO members.88
This approach is not without its own dangers, however.  Smaller,
more cohesive trading groups, like the EU, could adopt positions that
are difficult to reconcile with international negotiations.89  Rather
than serving as stepping-stones to global agreements, regional
agreements could increase competition and breed conflict.  In the
end, regional initiatives could undercut the WTO.90  The following
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Members Shy Away From Major Reform Of WTO Decision-Making Procedures, 17 INT’L
TRADE REP. (BNA) 550 (2000); Daniel Pruzin & Gary G. Yerkey, EU, United States Clash
Over Proposals for Agriculture Reform at WTO Meeting, 17 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1034
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negotiations, BNA INT’L TRADE DAILY, Jan. 21, 2000, available at WL 1/21/2000 BTD d7; Quad
group to accept ‘two plus’ solution for TRIMS compliance deadline extensions, BNA INT’L
TRADE DAILY, Nov. 6, 2000, available at WL 11/6/2000 BTD d3.
88. ASIA PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION, THIRD APEC SENIOR OFFICIALS MEETING,
APEC SECRETARIAL MEDIA ADVISORY 38/2000 (2000), available at http://www.apecsec.org.
sg/loadall?httP://www.apecsec.org.sg/whatsnew/press/rel38.2000.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2002)
(discussing preparations for an annual meeting of APEC ministers and economic leaders); Guy
de Jonquières, Asian ambition, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2000, at 14.
89. Dan Bilefsky, Move to reform EU farm policy suffers set back, FIN. TIMES (London
ed.), Apr. 25, 2001, at 10.
90. Martin Wolf, Bush’s free trade responsibility, FIN. TIMES (London ed.), Apr. 25, 2001,
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section, however, argues that APEC and ASEAN will likely act
synergistically with the WTO.
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AND THE FUTURE
PROSPECTS OF PACIFIC RIM ASSOCIATIONS
A. Leadership of the Pacific Rim
The wake of the Seattle ministerial meeting left the field quite
open to the emergence of leadership in the international trading
system.91  The years following Seattle proved a real test for “open
regionalism” and its ability to contribute to global consensus.  The
alternative was regional polarization via NAFTA and the EU, or, in
the case of APEC, the prospect of polarized groups within a region.92
Asian members of APEC would like to solve their own problems
without “Western” help or interference.  To this end, Japan sought to
undertake a leadership role and proposed a $16.6 billion debt facility
to guarantee bond issues for other Asian nations and to establish an
Asian equivalent of the IMF.  So far, however, these ideas have not
taken hold.  The APEC response was to call instead for a
strengthening of the international financial architecture.  The
Western economies did not favor a regional bank with Japan at its
head, but Japan knows that its recovery depends on Asia’s recovery,
and vice versa.  It hopes that a growing regional consciousness in
ASEAN and APEC might supplant bilateral and international action
and diminish western influence.93
Although the Asian recovery has been more rapid than expected,
it is far from robust.  Asia needs an economic engine, and the logical
choice is Japan.  Its output accounts for more than one-half of Asia’s
GDP.  But Japan seems preoccupied by its own economic woes and is
reluctant to assume the regional role that would normally fall to it.
                                                                                                                                     
at 23; New Bush administration signals fresh approach to WTO talks, 18 INT’L TRADE REP.
(BNA) 475 (2001).
91. Brevetti, supra note 87; C. Fred Bergsten, APEC to the rescue, ECONOMIST, Nov. 7,
1998, at 21; Wolf, supra note 90.
92. The gradual return of financial stability to the Pacific Rim region was important.  But,
whether a “new financial architecture” would result remained doubtful, because a leadership
vacuum existed in the Pacific Rim region.  Gary G. Yerkey, Asian Economic Recovery Taking
Hold, Likely to Last Through 2000, APEC Says, 16 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1493 (1999);
Fidler, supra note 8.
93. Toshio Aritake, Japan Proposes $16.6 Billion Debt Facility To Guarantee Bond Issues
in Asian Nations, 16 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 862 (1999); Japan offers plan to avert financial
crisis in Asia, FIN. TIMES, May 6, 2000, at 3; de Jonquières, supra note 88.
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To be fair, Japan invests heavily in Asia and is its largest provider of
aid.  But Japan’s approach to the Asian and the world market is a
“one-way” street.  The Japanese are keen to penetrate other nations’
markets, but prefer to close their own to foreign competition.94  Japan
is roundly criticized for this, and various attempts have been made,
particularly by the United States, to persuade Japan to open its
markets.  Meanwhile, a huge trade surplus has built up with the rest
of the world.  At its worst, this provokes restrictive market behavior,
which is the opposite of what APEC, ASEAN and the WTO
promote.95
In any case, despite enormous efforts, the world’s second-largest
economy has experienced low levels of growth since the early 1990s,
and it has been in recession for most of the past two years.96
Moreover, this has occurred in the face of ten or more government
stimulus packages worth a monumental 120 trillion yen (US $1.14
trillion), more than doubling the governments’ debt to GDP ratio
since 1990.97  The crisis in Japan shows no signs of abating as long as
consumer confidence and domestic consumption continue to remain
low.  In deep denial, the Japanese people and their politicians seem
unwilling or unable to undertake the economic reforms needed to
return Japan’s economy to a leadership position in the region.98  
                                                          
94. Jean-Pierre Lehmann, Why Asia needs a Japanese engine, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2000, at
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96. Japan’s GDP has contracted in seven of nine quarters.  Paul Abrahams, Japan’s fragile
growth, FIN. TIMES (London ed.), Mar. 14, 2000, at 23.
97. See id.  See also Paul Abrahams, Japanese economy slumps back into recession, FIN.
TIMES, Mar. 3, 2000, at 1.  For a general treatment of Japan’s experience and problems, see
FISCHER, supra note 6, ch. 11.
98. Gillian Tett, Economy tops the concerns of Japanese voters, FIN. TIMES, July 24, 2001,
at 6; Bill Powell, Japan’s Kamikaze Economy, FORTUNE, Sept. 3, 2001, at 175; Reform on Hold,
ECONOMIST, Sept. 8, 2001, at 43.  See also A bigger slice, supra note 95; Jenny Corbett, Does
Japan’s anti-deflation package add up?, APEC ECON. NEWSL., Feb. 2, 2003.
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China, Asia’s second largest economy, might become Asia’s
economic engine, but it has enormous problems of its own and is
thought by some to be “too backward—economically and
politically”—to play that role.99  Nonetheless, China’s economy has
continued to expand and liberalize, even during the Asian crisis.
Further, Taiwan’s accession to the WTO will likely strengthen trade
relationships in the region while cooperation with Taiwan could
potentially ease China’s entry into the world trade system, as well as
buffer long-standing frictions between the two economies.100  Despite
these positive indications, the government programs needed to keep
China growing have also substantially increased its debt.  Further, the
civilian government has not resolved its relationship with the People’s
Liberation Army, and it must address the “chronic overcapacity” of
its numerous loss-generating state enterprises.  This is likely to result
in higher unemployment, probable worker unrest, and an increased
welfare burden.101  Corruption also remains a major challenge to
Chinese designs on increased leadership.102
The Chinese leadership and other political and economic entities
in the Pacific Rim generally view China’s trade liberalization and
long-delayed entry into the WTO to be a positive step for China and
the world trade community.103  As President Clinton said, an engaged
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Mar. 7, 2000, at 16; Shai Oster, China’s Economy Posts Unexpected Growth; But Reliance on
Exports Seen as Problem, 17 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1821 (2000); Noah J. Smith, China
Eliminates Some Curbs to Selling $170 Billion in Non-Performing State Assets, 18 INT’L TRADE
REP. (BNA) 1793 (2001); James Kynge, 5m Chinese state workers to lose jobs, FIN. TIMES
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TIMES (London ed.), Apr. 14, 1999, at 7.
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(London ed.), July 22, 2000, at 7.
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Vows Market Reforms, 16 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1951 (1999) [hereinafter Market Reforms];
Shai Oster, Chinese Think Tank Sees More Pluses Than Minuses in China WTO Accession, 16
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rather than estranged China is a plus for the Pacific Rim.104  The
blessing of WTO membership is not undiluted, though.  Foreign
competition will increase, and jarring changes will be imposed,
internally and externally, on the Chinese economy.  Severe
dislocations are bound to result from these changes.105
Thus, while China is keen to attract foreign capital and expertise,
its officials remain ambivalent about giving foreigners unlimited
access to business opportunities, even though this behavior may
violate its WTO obligations.  As a result, the huge potential of
China’s market remains just that—potential.106
The United States is also a candidate for Pacific Rim leadership.
But, as the region recovers and expands, the U.S. role will likely be
diluted.  Further, its APEC partners tend to resent U.S. trade
pressure and this resentment is not exclusive to Japan and China.
Adding this resentment to the political backlash that a ballooning
trade deficit can provoke and the sting of failure from the Seattle
WTO ministerial, and the United States seems unlikely to command
the laboring oar in the Pacific Rim trade liberalization.107  Thus, it is
hard to envision a clear leader and it is likely that Japan, China, and
the United States will continue to share the mantle of leadership in
the Pacific Rim in the near to medium-term future.
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(2001); see China Will Continue to Ban Foreign Sales in Domestic Oil, Gas Markets, Despite
WTO, 18 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1229 (2001); The View from China, FORTUNE, Nov. 8, 1999,
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B. APEC
The Asian financial crisis and the failure of the WTO ministerial
meeting in Seattle, far from derailing APEC, have actually
strengthened it.  The APEC leaders’ declaration in Auckland
acknowledged that APEC softened the blow of the Asian crisis.
Greater activity on the part of APEC finance ministers and the
establishment of a private “Financiers Group” within APEC, as well
as the shock of the Asian crisis, have stimulated structural reform and
increased transparency in the region.  Moreover, APEC has pledged
to intervene earlier in any future financial crisis in order to mute its
severity.108
The failure of the Seattle WTO ministerial moved the initiative
for further trade liberalization, except the WTO’s “built-in” agenda
(agriculture and service), back to regional associations and bilateral
agreements.109  If organizations such as APEC did not already exist,
they might need to be created to advance negotiations in trade sectors
not addressed in Seattle.  After all, the Auckland APEC ministerial
was a reasonably positive one, whereas Seattle was quite a
disappointment.  Although the APEC leaders’ consensus at Auckland
broke down in Seattle, it was just as likely to be restored in APEC as
it was in the WTO.  Hence, the “disillusionment” that followed the
Kuala Lumpur summit proved fleeting, and there has been a “new
burst of interest in sub-regional arrangements” since Seattle.110
Indeed, Peter Drysdale, Director of the Australia-Japan Research
Centre at Australia’s National University, a keen observer of the
Pacific Rim, believes that it is well within APEC’s capacity “to define
a strategy for trade and economic diplomacy,” particularly among
developed and developing economics.  For example, APEC has
helped integrate China into “international economic affairs.”  APEC
also gave China a platform to promote itself in the region and the
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world when it hosted the 2001 APEC ministerial in Shanghai.111
Without doubt, “APEC is the right forum for encouraging
understanding of the value to the United States and to its Asia Pacific
partners [of harmonizing] trade”112 and accepting temporary trade
imbalances in order to speed Asian recovery, build stable economies,
and open trade.  Whereas “U.S. trade policy is deeply committed to
reciprocity . . . [t]his is inconsistent with the APEC [voluntary] modus
operandi.  The United States will not quickly change, and it is neither
possible nor desirable for APEC to change.”113  Yet some flexibility
will be necessary on both sides.114
To their credit, APEC members have for the most part resisted
the temptation to use the Asian crisis as a pretext for trade
retrenchment.  And, as much as APEC has been called a toothless
“talking shop” by some, it has proved to be an essential forum for
leveraging market reforms in the world’s largest trading community;
it is a place for national leaders to strike sensitive deals.115
Between Seattle in 1999 and Doha in 2001, APEC needed to
emphasize the facilitation of its own program.116  The presumption at
Auckland was that the process of trade liberalization would be
transferred to the WTO in a new GATT round.  After the failure of
the Seattle ministerial, however, the initiative fell back on APEC,
which introduced a program every bit as ambitious as a WTO Round.
Even though a new round of WTO trade talks was launched at Doha,
it will take years to complete.  And there is every reason to believe
that the sectorial talks already launched in services and agriculture
will be held hostage to the completion of the full round.117
Conversely, the Seattle ministerial did highlight some major
issues in globalization where APEC can make a difference.118  One is
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“the linkage between [trade] liberalization and other policy areas.”119
Indeed, Seattle “put a spotlight on the capacity of developing
[economies] to negotiate and implement [trade] agreements” that
substantially impact their economic structure and pace of
development.120  This included economic assistance to weaker Pacific
Rim economies.121
The final reason why APEC might have a significant medium-
term impact on trade liberalization, both in the Pacific Rim and
globally, is its broad-based commitment to that goal.  By setting
discrete timelines, reporting commitments with monitoring and
today’s peer review, this momentum has not flagged significantly
since Bogor.122  APEC’s history shows that it has always moved in fits
and achieves more progress in good economic times than in bad.
Finding common ground among APEC’s diverse membership has
always been difficult.  Critics claim that APEC economies defer to
bilateral or WTO deals because they cannot deliver on their
voluntary pledges.  What critics miss is that APEC provides a regular
forum for trade opening agreements and that unilateral and bilateral
pledges often serve as a prototype for multilateral agreements, so
progress is made either way.123
Moreover, the role of business in guiding and supporting the
process of trade liberalization in the Pacific Rim cannot be
overstated.  Private businesses control much of the capital and
technical know-how that will make the lofty goals of APEC
achievable.  That is why the ABAC plays such an influential role in
APEC’s work, and why businesspersons are so concerned that the
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economics of world trade be understood.124  Private capital can flee
foreign markets faster than public capital, but it is also quick to return
once the fundamentals are rectified.  It would be foolhardy for
businesses to avoid the Asia-Pacific region, which accounts for about
one-half of global trade.125
Allowing businesspersons to play a larger role in market opening
has proved to be highly successful.  They speak a common language,
operate internationally, work largely outside the public eye, and do
not need to run for office.  Because businesspersons interact regularly
on matters of mutual interest, suspicion and xenophobia break down
more quickly compared to similar interactions by political leaders.
The ABAC has played such a role in APEC.
If the APEC summits in Vancouver, Kuala Lumpur, and
Auckland ran the gamut from disappointing to moderately successful,
the November 2000 summit in Brunei Darussalam was a genuine
success.  The Brunei reports are more energized than those from
previous summits, and planning was more concrete and focused.  For
example, the finance ministers noted an improved Asian economy,
but opined that APEC had a “role” in achieving maximum benefit at
minimum risk, which could be continued by pursuing sound economic
and fiscal policy while carrying out structural reforms.126  There
remained the prospect of a global, external shock that could be
absorbed only by improved international financial architecture,
however.  Banking supervision and securities regulation in Asia need
to be improved, as does corporate governance and transparency in
the private sector.127  Finally, the finance ministers promoted
“privatization.”128
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generally Lawrence Speer, Business Groups Agree to Launch World Chambers Network on
Web, 16 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1607 (1999).
125. Asia’s bounce-back, ECONOMIST, Aug. 21, 1999, at 11; Vicki Bakhshi, Investment in
Asian Returns to Favour, FIN. TIMES (Int’l ed.), June 28, 1999, at 1; ‘99 Record Year for U.S.
Manufacturers’ Foreign Direct Investment, Forecast Says, 17 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 55
(2000); Fareed Zakaria, The Big Story Everyone Missed, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 30, 2002, at 52.
126. See generally ASIA PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION, JOINT MINISTERIAL
STATEMENT, SEVENTH APEC FINANCE MINISTERS MEETING (2000), available at
http://www.apecsec.org.sg/virtualib/minismtg/mtgfin2000.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2003) (esp.
items 4, 5–7, 9, 10–11, 13, 16, 19, 22–24 and 26) [hereinafter SEVENTH MINISTERIAL MEETING,
JOINT STATEMENT].
127. Id.; Gordon de Brouwer, Finance in an East Asia community, APEC ECON. NEWSL.,
Mar. 3, 2002.
128. See SEVENTH JOINT MINISTERIAL MEETING, JOINT STATEMENT, supra note 126.
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The “declaration” of APEC economic leaders in Brunei touched
on numerous items carried forward from Auckland, but added a
number of new initiatives as well.  The Brunei report was three times
longer than Auckland’s, excluding annexes.  Like preceding
conferences, the report began with a reaffirmation of “confidence in
the APEC vision,” which has been reinvigorated since Seattle, and
the leaders expressed “renew[ed] . . . determination” to reach that
vision through the Bogor goals and the OAA.129  However, they also
urged the launch of a new WTO round in 2001, with a “balanced and
sufficiently broad-based agenda that responds to the interests and
concerns of all WTO members,” even though differences remained
among APEC members regarding the content of that agenda.130
Finally, they promoted the rapid accession of non-included APEC
members (China, Taiwan, Russia and Vietnam) to the WTO.131
Among many new initiatives was an instruction to ministers to
redouble their efforts to cause APEC economies to take the
“required structural adjustments;” to pursue “massive infrastructure
development and human capacity building” to “attract business
investment;” and a “wide-ranging Action Agenda” in the area of
information technology . . . .”132  Not all of these initiatives were
wholly new.  Interestingly, what strikes one about this latest report is
its emphasis on “social safety nets,” least developed economies, youth
and education and individual and institutional capacity building, and
its stress on information technology development through public-
private collaboration.133  The APEC agenda has progressed well
beyond market opening and liberalization.  It is more comprehensive,
it is more sensitive, and it is more concrete.
If anything, APEC ministers (meeting just before the economic
leaders) took a bolder approach, except for the issue of a WTO round
in 2001.  They too urged that a round be launched at the “earliest
opportunity,” but set no date.134  Perhaps this was because some
                                                          
129. ASIA PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION, LEADERS’ DECLARATION, pt. 1 (2000),
available at http://www.apecsec.org.sg/whatsnew/press/rel57_2000.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2003)
[hereinafter LEADERS’ DECLARATION].
130. Id. pt. 23; Sheila McNulty, Leaders Call for New Trade Round, FIN. TIMES (London
ed.), Nov. 17, 2000, at 17.
131. LEADERS’ DECLARATION, supra note 129, pts. 22–28.
132. Id. pts. 11–12, 16–17, 18.
133. Id. pts. 11, 23–25, 8, 16–18, 21, 30–31 and 36, 13, 15–16, 18, 14, 29, and 32–33,
respectively.  See also Corbett B. Daly, APEC Leaders Push for WTO Round in 2001, Pledge to
Wire Region to Internet by 2010, 17 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1778 (2000).
134. Corbett B. Daly, APEC Ministers Call for New Round in 2001, But Fail to Set Specific
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ministers opposed an early round or doubted it was possible.135  Just as
likely, it was because they were charged with shoring up the Pacific-
Rim economies most affected by the Asian crisis and forging ahead
with regional initiatives in the absence of a global round.  They
emphasized that capacity-building and “the full realization of the
potential of economic growth” depends on “close cooperation
between government and business,”136 a theme that recurs throughout
the report.
The ministers also addressed the prospect of a “digital divide” in
Asia, and the importance of a public-private partnership to address it,
with emphasis on the role of private capital.  The stress laid on this
partnership—on capacity building, on education and training, on
information and communication technology, and on small and
medium-sized enterprises—is quite remarkable when compared to
prior, more generalized reports.137  It was as if the Asian crisis and the
failed WTO ministerial had finally driven APEC ministers to focus on
regional recovery and development.
The APEC Business Advisory Council (ABAC) report in
October 2000 was just as uncompromising.138  As in the past, the
ABAC prodded APEC leaders to take bolder, more concrete steps.
The ABAC report was reflected in the leader’s declaration and the
report they received from their finance ministers (with whom the
ABAC met twice in 2000).139  In particular, the ABAC report opined
that “APEC must go beyond acknowledging the need for capacity-
building [and give] substance to it.”140  The report noted that the
“[IAP] process is APEC’s primary [trade liberalization]
mechanism . . . [but] that, in many cases, the IAPs . . . contained
                                                                                                                                     
Date, 17 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1744 (2000).
135. Id.
136. ASIA PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION, TWELFTH APEC MINISTERIAL MEETING,
JOINT STATEMENT, pts. 3, 9, and 65 (2000).  It should be remembered that, while IAPs are
voluntary, APEC members are under constant pressure from other members and businesses to
improve them.  Because of this pressure, by 2001, two-thirds of APEC members had submitted
their IAPs to voluntary “peer review.”  Id. pt. 8.
137. See id. pts. 55, 3, 9, 11–12, 15, 56 and 63–65; 9, 33, 35, 42–43 and 66–68; 41, 46, 69; 44, 47,
53; and 33, 48, 58 respectively.
138. APEC BUSINESS ADVISORY COUNCIL, FACING GLOBALIZATION THE APEC WAY:
REPORT TO THE APEC LEADERS (Oct. 2000), available at http://tyr.apecsec.org.sg/abac/reports/
ABAC-Report_2000.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2003).
139. Id. at 20.
140. Id. at 2.
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incomplete information.”141  However, the ABAC welcomed the new
e-IAP system, since the perception was that it would “greatly improve
the comparability and transparency of [IAPs].”142  Nevertheless, the
ABAC felt that “strengthening” the multilateral trading system,
underpinned by the WTO, should “remain APEC’s top priority.”143
What does all the activity at Brunei signify?  It seems to reflect a
re-energized APEC at every level.  All constituencies seemed ready,
and many eager, to board the WTO bandwagon once it got rolling,
but none seemed ready to wait for it.  In comparison to Brunei, the
2001 APEC ministerial in Shanghai was a tame affair.  By that time a
new GATT round was all but launched,144 China and Taiwan’s
accession to the WTO was a foregone conclusion, and the global
trade agenda was hijacked by the threat of terrorism.145  The
Taiwanese delegation did not attend the Shanghai summit, due to
lingering tensions with China over its “one-China” policy.146  The
meeting was a success, however, insofar as China got the opportunity
to underscore, on its own turf, its conversion to trade liberalization.
Furthermore, face-to-face meetings between China’s President Jiang
and America’s new President Bush allowed them to quell (actually,
by not mentioning) smoldering tensions regarding a proposed missile
defense shield, the bombing of China’s embassy in Belgrade, and a
collision between an American surveillance aircraft and a Chinese
fighter, in which a Chinese pilot was lost.147
Notwithstanding these clouds over the APEC proceedings, the
talks went ahead.  Even if APEC is a mere “talking shop” (as some
claim), talks are good.  This is especially so if they involve regional
competitors.  What can be worked out in the complex APEC crucible,
can often be translated into a global solution.148  While consensus at
the WTO level may take years (its 2005 deadline for concluding the
                                                          
141. Id.
142. Id. at 4–5.  The e-IAP system allows for the electronic filing and comparison of IAPs.
143. Id. at 6.
144. Lionel Barber, Key Players in a New Trade Round, EUROPE, Oct. 2001, at 11; Daniel
Pruzin, Moore Says New WTO Round Within Grasp But Cautions Important Differences
Remain, 18 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1774 (2001).
145. China’s disappointment, ECONOMIST, Oct. 20, 2001, at 46.
146. Mure Dickie, Taiwan Boycotts Regional Meeting, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2001, available at
2001 WL 29304395.
147. Gerard Baker, Familiar hostilities lie behind the warm words, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2001,
available at 2001 WL 28472145; Friends Again, for Now, ECONOMIST, Oct. 13, 2001, at 41.
148. Guy de Jonquières, Talkshop in Search of a New Direction, FIN. TIMES (U.K. ed.), Oct.
16, 2001, available at 2001 WL 29303441 [hereinafter Talkshop].
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Doha talks seems hopelessly optimistic), APEC nations may pave the
way for convergence in the Pacific Rim much more quickly.  In this
respect, APEC has more influence than ASEAN.
The most important single step the APEC leaders took in
Shanghai was to vigorously support a new GATT launch in Doha, just
a month later, even though some APEC economies were reluctant.149
While their language was equivocal, APEC’s economic leaders also
endorsed some help for weaker regional economies, in order to spur
economic recovery in Asia and guarantee success in Doha.150  More
concretely, the leaders called for an extended moratorium on customs
duties on e-commerce; supported WTO accession for China, Taiwan,
Russia and Vietnam; and, in the so-called “Shanghai Accord,” called
on APEC to broaden its “vision,” clarify its “roadmap” and proceed
with “implementation.”151  The latter was to be achieved, in part,
through “pathfinder initiatives,” in which two or more APEC
members would agree to further liberalization as a spur to the rest.152
This seems like a strongly worded call to action, in case the Doha
WTO ministerial ended in disappointment.  Although Doha did not
fail, the Accord could easily have borne fruit earlier, given that it calls
for trade facilitation measures such as increased transparency in
investment rules, regulations, standards, and government
procurement.  In the words of one diplomat, this moves APEC “from
cheerleader to a player,” and could pave the way for WTO
agreements in these areas.153  Another source concluded that the
Shanghai meeting “demonstrat[ed] once again APEC’s pre-eminence
as the body for regional cooperation in the Asia Pacific.”154
                                                          
149. Gary G. Yerkey, New WTO Trade Talks Look Likely As APEC Ministers Also Back
Fresh Round, 18 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1630 (2001); Philippines Cautious on New WTO
Round Talks, but Will Support APEC Consensus, 18 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1608 (2001);
ASIA PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION, APEC ECONOMIC LEADERS’ DECLARATION:
MEETING NEW CHALLENGES IN THE NEW CENTURY, pt. 21 (2001), available at
http://www.apecsec.org.sg/virtualib/econlead/china.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2003) [hereinafter
APEC LEADERS’ DECLARATION].  See also Dirk Beveridge, Malaysian Leader Says Trade
Should Aid Poor, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 21, 2001, at A16.
150. APEC LEADERS’ DECLARATION, supra note 149, pts. 5–19.  See also Glen Parkinson
Asia-Pacific Developing Members Stress Implementation Issues at Doha Ministerial, 18 INT’L
TRADE REP. (BNA) 1561 (2001).
151. APEC LEADERS’ DECLARATION, supra note 149, pts. 23, 24, and App. 1.  See also
Gary G. Yerkey, APEC Adopts ‘Pathfinder’ Plan to Spur Free Trade Goals, Promote Digital
Society, 18 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1698 (2001).
152. Id.
153. Chris Rugaber, 2002 Outlook, 19 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 159, 160 (2002).
154. Findlay & Parsons, supra note 116.
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Contrary to news reports,155 APEC’s late 2002 summit in Mexico
was not co-opted by concerns about terrorism and security.
Naturally, terrorism was a concern because of the events of
September 11th and the more recent attacks in Bali and Russia.156
However, the Mexican summit reports of APEC ministers157 and
economic leaders158 (the latter often echoing the former) are not
dominated by security concerns.  Words may be cheap, but when
compared to other APEC reports, these are clearly meant to press
ahead with APEC’s broad trade agenda.  Rather than curtailing
ambitions in the face of uncertainty and a global economic slowdown,
APEC economic leaders “resolved to . . . accelerate progress towards
the . . . Bogor goals.”159  They expressed their “determin[ation] to
translate [the] APEC vision into concrete benefits . . . through greater
assessment, accountability and action.”160  Among many initiatives
specifically mentioned were the GATT’s Doha Development
Agenda, the Shanghai Accord, APEC’s Trade Facilitation Action
Plan, and “transforming the digital divide into a digital opportunity”
for less-developed Asian economies.161  The ministers’ report was
even more explicit.  It supported “an open, rules-based multilateral
trading system under the [WTO]” noting the “dynamic and catalytic
role that APEC plays [in the process].”162  It agreed that “capacity and
confidence building . . . under the APEC Strategic Plan should remain
a top priority for APEC,”163 and that broadening the OAA “put
APEC on a faster track to achieve the Bogor goals”164 and timetable.
The seriousness of the ministers’ commitment is illustrated by two
initiatives: first, the great majority of APEC economies have now
agreed to submit their IAPs to peer review and, second, APEC’s
                                                          
155. Alexander Hanrath, Focus on Safer Rather Than Freer Borders, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 28,
2002, at 3, available at 2002 WL 101377361; Tim Wiener, War Clouds Will Darken Asia-Pacific
Meeting in Mexico, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2002, at A9.
156. Id.
157. ASIA PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION, JOINT STATEMENT, FOURTEENTH APEC
MINISTERIAL MEETING (2002), available at http://www.apec2002.org.mx/index.cfm?action
=news&IdNews=54 (last visited Mar. 2, 2003) [hereinafter JOINT STATEMENT].
158. ASIA PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION, APEC ECONOMIC LEADERS’
DECLARATION (2002), available at http://www.apec2002.org.mx/index.cfm?action=news&I
dNews=81 (last visited Mar. 2, 2003).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. JOINT STATEMENT, supra note 157.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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sponsorship of a first-ever Young Leaders and Entrepreneurs Forum
to involve the next generation in the ongoing work of the regional
trade group.165  While there was support for the Doha round of GATT
negotiations and a plea for a unified APEC position therein, there
was no inclination to delay APEC’s agenda because of the GATT
talks.  Indeed, it was quite the opposite.166
C. ASEAN
What about ASEAN?  Will it play a role?  As mentioned
previously, most ASEAN economies are smaller and generally less
well developed than their APEC counterparts, although the stronger
of ASEAN economies are also members of APEC.  By banding
together as ASEAN, these exclusively Asian countries hoped to exert
more influence within APEC and the world trading system, and to
pursue initiatives of their own.  This is exactly what they have done,
but with mixed results.
ASEAN’s weaker economies got a boost from the failure of the
Seattle ministerial, since one outcome was to place the needs of the
LDCs higher on APEC’s trade agenda.167  Because some of the LDCs
are in Southeast Asia and are members of ASEAN, ASEAN may
extract greater concessions from APEC.168  This is, in effect, what
ASEAN countries have been asking for: the capital and technical
know-how to develop their economies.  The increased concern for
LDCs, however, also advances western goals, since increased capital
and technology transfer will come with increased western oversight.
The technology should improve living standards, health, working
conditions, and resource conservation.  It could be a win-win
situation.
Several ambitious ASEAN proposals, however, have achieved
little success.  For example, it was suggested that ASEAN countries
develop a seamless telecommunications network and a uniform
                                                          
165. Id.
166. See ASIA PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION, NINTH APEC FINANCE MINISTERS’
MEETING, JOINT MINISTERIAL STATEMENT (2002), available at http://www.apecsec.org.
sg/virtualib/minismtg/mtgfin2002.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2003); ASIA PACIFIC ECONOMIC
COOPERATION, SHARING DEVELOPMENT TO REINFORCE GLOBAL SECURITY, ABAC REPORT
TO APEC ECONOMIC LEADERS (2002), available at http://www.apec.info/2002ABACReport.
pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2003) (noting “that APEC should work with a sense of urgency to
support the recovery in the global economy”).
167. See JOINT STATEMENT, supra note 157 (discussing the Doha Development Agenda).
168. Gutierrez, supra note 103.
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regulatory framework.169  At their 1998 summit in Vietnam, ASEAN
leaders adopted a “Hanoi Plan” designed to accelerate the
development of an ASEAN Free Trade Area, create an ASEAN
Investment Area to “keep ASEAN a player” and attract foreign
investment.170  But these plans were slow to progress.  ASEAN is
always trying to develop common positions for multinational trade
negotiations in order to protect its regional interests and secure
concessions.171  The ASEAN group, however, like many
intergovernmental organizations, is hamstrung by internal
disagreements.172  Often, it has come together only around initiatives
proposed by three of its stronger neighbors—APEC nations China,
Japan, and South Korea.173
One such plan, put forward by China, was to establish an East
Asian Free Trade zone (AFTA), which would include ASEAN,
China, Japan and South Korea.174  To be sure, the proposal was
greeted cautiously.175  If consummated, it could become a trading bloc
similar to, but far looser than, the EU or NAFTA.  The Chinese plan,
however, faces severe obstacles.176  ASEAN members are divided
over how quickly to liberalize trade and are struggling to implement
existing plans to lower import barriers.177  China, moreover, could
become preoccupied by its efforts to meet the requirements of WTO
membership.  At the same time, Japan and South Korea do not wish
                                                          
169. See Amy Kazmin, Chuan urges ASEAN to move on free trade area, FIN. TIMES
(London ed.), Oct. 6, 2000, at 11.
170. Chad Bowman, Southeast Asia Leaders Adopt ‘Hanoi Plan’ That Speeds Trade,
Investment Liberalization, 15 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 2122 (1998); ASSOCIATION OF
SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS, HANOI PLAN OF ACTION (1998), available at
http://www.aseansec.org/ 10382.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2003) [hereinafter HANOI PLAN OF
ACTION].
171. See Bowman, supra note 170; HANOI PLAN OF ACTION, supra note 170; Rafael D.
Frankel, ASEAN Members Accelerate Framework for ‘e-ASEAN’, Elimination of IT Tariffs, 18
INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1475 (2001); Rafael D. Frankel, Deadlines for ASEAN Investment
Area Moved Up in Bid to Draw Foreign Investment, 18 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1476 (2001).
See ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS, JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ OF THE 34TH
ASEAN MINISTERIAL MEETING (2001), available at http://www.aseansec.org/3045.htm (last
visited Mar. 2, 2003).
172. See Kazmin, supra note 169.
173. Id.
174. Corbett B. Daly & Jason Gutierrez, ASEAN Leaders Pledge to Study Possibility of East
Asia Trade Zone, 17 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1819 (2000) (discussing initiatives by China,
Japan and South Korea to achieve greater economic integration in East Asia).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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to be co-opted by the growing influence of China.178 Regardless of
these concerns, China recently signed a framework agreement with
ASEAN to establish a comprehensive free trade area by 2010.179
Whether the free trade area will eventually be established is unclear,
but the framework agreement does improve China’s influence in the
region, as well as that of developing economies generally.180  A free
trade area would enable ASEAN to recoup some lost foreign
investment and gain improved access to what should be a growing
market.181  Other agreements are being discussed with Australia and
New Zealand (once shunned as non-Asian), and closer ties are being
sought with the EU.182  The United States, however, appears
uninterested in closer relations,183 and ASEAN’s plans for increased
liberalization in the short term appear to have stagnated.
This stagnation is reflected in ASEAN’s recently adopted
measures relaxing already-agreed tariff cuts (a “temporary exclusion
list”), because its members were either unwilling or unable to meet
them.184  Although ASEAN nations stoutly deny “backtracking,” this
“more flexible mechanism” will not build confidence within or
outside ASEAN.185  Consequently, one has to wonder whether
ASEAN will ever blossom into a true trading bloc with the influence
it covets.  Meanwhile, ASEAN members seem as disposed to be
                                                          
178. Gary G. Yerkey, Supachai Says China Will Need to Prove Itself As ‘Decent’ WTO
Member to Avoid Disputes, 19 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 237 (2002) (discussing sentiment
within the WTO that China will be too preoccupied with its own compliance to play a major
leadership role); John Thornhill & Gillian Tett, Colliding Interests, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2001.
179. Amy Kazmin, ASEAN and China sign deal for free trade area, FIN. TIMES (London
ed.), Nov. 5, 2002, at 14, also available at 2002 WL 102373717.
180. Id.; Amy Kazmin, Beijing looks to bring neighbours under its wing, FIN. TIMES (London
ed.), Nov. 5, 2002, at 14, also available at 2002 WL 102373718.
181. John Burton, Asian leaders look to free trade area with China, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2001,
available at 2001 WL 29308061.
182. Rafael D. Frankel, ASEAN Agrees to Broaden Economic, Trade Ties with Australia,
New Zealand, 18 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1477 (2001) (discussing ASEAN agreement to a
“close economic partnership” with Australia and New Zealand); Rafael D. Frankel, Momentum
toward New WTO Round Emerges From EU and ASEAN Meetings, 18 INT’L TRADE REP.
(BNA) 1477, 1477–78 (2001) (discussing EU and ASEAN initiatives to narrow the gaps on a
range of issues threatening the success of the WTO Doha round).
183. See generally Chris Rugaber, Zoellick Meets ASEAN Ministers, While State Dept.
Official Urges Closer Trade Ties, 19 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 655, 655–56 (2002) (while
supportive of closer trading relations in theory, U.S. Trade Rep. Robert Zoellick said it was “far
too early to talk about road maps” and a U.S. State Dept. official expressed concern over
human rights violations in ASEAN member countries).
184. Glen Perkinson, ASEAN FTA Agrees to Ease Rules On Tariff Cuts for Sensitive
Products, 17 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1354 (2000).
185. Id.
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independent operators as a true trading group.186
D. Today’s Challenges in the Pacific Rim
The most important recent event affecting APEC and ASEAN
did not happen in the Pacific Rim but in the Arabian Gulf city of
Doha, Qatar.  For it was there, in mid-November 2001, that China
and Taiwan were both admitted to the WTO, which initiated a new
round of GATT negotiations.  China and Taiwan were the two largest
Asian economies still outside the WTO,187 so their inclusion decidedly
increases Asian influence in the Organization.  It is also likely to
distract attention from regional trade associations.  APEC and
ASEAN, however, may prove to be useful vehicles to promote Asian
trade agendas—particularly China’s, for there is a palpable sense that
China and Japan are competing with one another for leadership in the
Pacific Rim, and that China seems to be winning.  China has a large
and rapidly developing economy, but with enormous structural
problems to overcome.  If it can do so successfully, and if Japan’s
economy does not recover from a decade of low or no growth, then
China could supplant Japan as Asia’s economic engine.188
Finally, Pacific Rim trading partners have begun to negotiate
bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) with one another when
regional or international negotiations falter.189  This means that
bilateral, regional, and multilateral negotiations are “in play” at the
                                                          
186. Peter Montagnon, U.S. curbing cooperation efforts, says Mahathir, FIN. TIMES (London
ed.), Oct. 6, 2000, at 11; Colin Barlow, Conditions for Malaysia’s economic progress, APEC
ECON. NEWSL., Aug. 2000; Sheila McNulty, Malaysia plans policy shift to attract foreign
investors, FIN. TIMES (London ed.), Oct. 30, 2000, at 14.
187. Gary G. Yerkey & Daniel Pruzin, New Bush Administration Signals Fresh Approach to
WTO Talks, 18 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 154, 156 (2001).
188. See generally FISCHER, supra note 6.  Of particular note is ch. 12 (arguing that China,
having been eclipsed and embarrassed by the West, will redouble its efforts to master the skills
needed to prosper in today’s trading world) and ch. 11 (arguing that Japan has gone from being
the envy of other nations to a global pariah.”).  See also Noah J. Smith, Taipei Complains of
China Action to Bar It From Talks With Hong Kong, Macao, ASEAN, 18 INT’L TRADE REP.
(BNA) 1950, 1950–51 (2001) (China is showing a budding leadership role in the region, but
distance still remains between Taiwan and China); Toshio Aritake, METI Says Japan Trade
Woes Not a Worry, But Warns China Is Formidable Competitor, 18 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA)
1233 (2001); Pruzin & Yerkey, Japan Hits Back at Zoellick, supra note 107, at 1780–81 (U.S.
Trade Rep. criticized Japan for its “negative attitude” over the upcoming ministerial
conference).  Noah J. Smith, China Blocks Japanese Imports in Move Seen as Retaliation for
Emergency Tariffs, 18 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 711 (2001) (discussing the potential for
continued retaliatory trade measures between China and Japan).
189. Sheila McNulty, Bilateral trade deals gain favour, FIN. TIMES (London ed.), Nov. 16,
2000, at 17.
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same time.  Pressure to reach any favorable trade deal is exerted by
regional consolidation such as the prospect of EU enlargement; by
the Western Hemispheric pursuit of a Free Trade Association of the
Americas; and by APEC’s ever-expanding agenda.
Singapore has long favored FTAs, and agreed in Brunei to
negotiate one with the United States.  Japan also recently embraced
the idea and is negotiating one with South Korea.  APEC ministers
have approved such arrangements, providing they are WTO and
APEC compatible.  The arrangements are, after all, easy to negotiate
between similar economies.  Whether bilateral FTAs contribute to, or
detract from, regional and multilateral negotiations remains to be
seen.  They are at best a patchwork.  FTAs are being pursued,
however, out of frustration with the slow pace of multilateral
negotiations.  Despite being motivated by frustration, negotiations at
any level are generally positive, and often synergistic.190  In other
promising news for proponents of trade liberalization, the Bush
administration, despite its preference for a new GATT round, is
prepared to negotiate regional (FTAA, APEC) and bilateral deals as
a way of maintaining momentum.191
Economic recovery and reform in Asia have brought fresh
opportunities, but also new challenges.  After all, the numerous
“capacities” referred to in various trade documents need to be built,
and the significant problems of developing the LDCs need to be
addressed.192  For the moment, APEC is the nearest thing to a
laboratory in which to develop initiatives to address third-generation
trade problems.193  This is because APEC is small, diversified, and
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includes both developed and developing nations, East and West.  So
long as global organizations do not advance the trade agenda,
regional ones surely will.194
IV.  CONCLUSION
New trade deals are just as likely—probably even more likely—
to be worked out within regional trade groups such as APEC, as in a
full WTO round.195  Whereas GATT negotiations are expected to be
ongoing, the next WTO ministerial will not be held until September
2003, and promises to be difficult.196  To expect the round to conclude
by 2005 seems Panglossian.197  APEC leaders, however, meet
annually, and have developed relationships with non-governmental
organizations and business leaders (the APEC Business Advisory
Council), relationships still not formalized in the WTO.  Hence,
APEC initiatives can have a profound effect on WTO undertakings,
not least because of the size and importance of the Pacific Rim
region.  In truth, the two blocks act synergistically.  But the synergism
often begins in APEC.198
That does not mean to imply that APEC members will always act
as a block.  Rather, APEC will evolve into a variety of floating
alliances, depending upon the issue involved.  These alliances will be
neither Eastern or Western but will frequently combine the two.  For
example, the United States and Australia do not agree about certain
issues involving autos, textiles and agriculture.  Our best ally in the
South Pacific is closer to Asia on the former two.  Australia and
Japan enjoy a growing bipolar trade but do not agree on agriculture.
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197. See Jane Drake-Brockman, New WTO Round launched at Doha, APEC ECON.
NEWSL., Dec. 2001 (discussing how APEC member governments realized the value of
comprehensive rather than sectoral negotiations).
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Japan is looking to increase its trade with Asia and Latin America, as
is Korea with China.199
Even if APEC is no more than a “talking shop,”200 it does draw
together the leaders of twenty-one important economies once
annually and their ministers far more frequently.  There is always
pressure on APEC leaders to take some further market-opening step.
Whereas ministers may be wary, even timid, the leaders do not want
to be seen as such.  No doubt they are emboldened by the company of
fellow leaders and the prospect of joint action.  They confront one
another about unfulfilled promises and try to agree on future goals.
In bilateral and multilateral meetings, they are able to promote their
interests while learning the problems of their counterparts.  If some
new trade openings can be negotiated in these circumstances, even if
voluntary, that is progress.
Every summit since Seattle in 1993 has seen some widening or
deepening of APEC pledges.201  That is what APEC is all about: peer
group pressure to open domestic economies; to foster cooperation;
and to end suspicion and animus.  As a group, APEC leaders have
shown a capacity for vision and commitment that virtually none of
them would have undertaken unilaterally.  Their agreements have a
head start at the WTO level because of the size and diversity of the
Pacific Rim economies.
Regional cohesion was slowed by the recent economic turmoil in
Asia, although that very turmoil produced needed reforms.  Recovery
has not been easy, given the pressure on each nation to rebuild its
economy, even at the expense of its neighbors.  But the region will
succeed or fail as a whole, due to its interdependence.202  This requires
collective action, and APEC is an obvious vehicle for this.
This is not to say that APEC (or ASEAN for that matter) will
necessarily play the role that it might play within the region.  For, as
recounted above, the Asian-Pacific market is in a significant state of
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flux.  Will China’s effort to meet its WTO obligations (or to avoid or
defer them)203 distract it from further regional involvement?  It
appears doubtful because China, a self-professed “developing
economy,” has allies in the region (particularly among ASEAN
members) to help it confront the WTO.204  Moreover, a recent,
smooth leadership change in China left former Communist
party boss Jiang Zemin and his cohorts enough power to ensure
the continuity of his market reform program.  Will the contest
between China and Japan over Asian “leadership” divide the region?
Apparently not, insofar as China appears to have the momentum and
Japan seems disinterested or distracted.205  Will ASEAN, which finally
launched its long-planned free trade area in 2002, seize the initiative
from APEC?206  This is possible, but unlikely.  China, Japan, and
South Korea are likely to cultivate relations with both regional groups
in order to leverage WTO negotiations and enforcement.  But they
are members only of APEC.  Furthermore, Asian economies cannot
prosper without the Americas, and the latter nations are represented
regionally in APEC alone.
So, far from marginalizing Asian-Pacific regional trade
associations, the WTO seems to be taking aboard some of their
suggestions and initiatives.  Rather than competing, the WTO and the
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Asian Pacific regional trade associations are acting synergistically.
WTO negotiations could easily be influenced by consensus
agreements reached first in smaller regional groups, like APEC and
ASEAN, which represent nearly one-half of world trade.207
Ultimately, regional coalitions cannot pursue their objectives at
the expense of global concerns.  The former ultimately must be a
stepping-stone to the latter.  This will require U.S. leadership, but of a
more enlightened sort.  At the end of the day, national, or even
regional concerns, must give way to the greater good.208
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